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March 9, 2009
Where the intent to arbitrate once again prevailed
Following its earlier decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India (“Court”), by its order dated February
11, 2009, passed in Arbitration Application No. 6 of 2007, filed
by M/s. Nandan Biomatrix Ltd. (“Applicant”)
against D1 Oils Ltd. (“D1 Oils”), held
that the existence of an arbitration agreement was required to
be gathered from the intention of the parties to resolve
disputes through arbitration and the Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996 (“the Act”) did not prescribe any
form for an arbitration agreement. The Court also, exercising
its judicial power under Section 11 of the Act, as elucidated
upon in S.B.P. & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd.1,
proceeded to delve into the issue of whether there was a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties and whether there
existed a live claim between the parties. In this matter, the
Court has referred all disputes and differences between the
parties to the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, which
would nominate an arbitrator from its panel to decide all
disputes and differences.
Background:
On August 10, 2004, the parties had entered into an agreement
for inter alia supply of seeds and establishing nurseries (“Supply
Agreement”). The Supply Agreement contained an
arbitration clause whereunder “Any dispute that arises
between the parties shall be resolved by submitting the same to
the institutional arbitration in India under the provisions of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”
In addition to the Supply Agreement, the parties also entered
into a joint venture agreement on September 30, 2004 (“Joint
Venture Agreement”) and a research and development
agreement on November 26, 2004 (“R&D Agreement”).
Whilst the Joint Venture Agreement did not contain an
arbitration clause, an arbitration clause was incorporated into
the R&D Agreement on April 09, 2005 by an addendum. However it
was claimed by D1 Oils that on October 16, 2004, an agreement
terminating the Supply Agreement (“Deed of Termination”)
was executed by and between the parties whereunder, the Supply
Agreement purportedly stood terminated.
Disputes arose between parties, when the Applicant claimed
damages under the Supply Agreement. The Applicant contended that
the said Deed of Termination was not executed by the Applicant
and the Deed of Termination was brought about by D1 Oils forging
the signatures of the directors of the Applicant, with a view to
avoid the liabilities and obligations under the Supply
Agreement. The Applicant claimed knowledge of the Deed of
Termination only on May 24, 2005 and further claimed that the
two directors whose signatures had been forged did not, in fact,
have the authority to sign the Deed of termination and to
investigate the matter further, the Applicant lodged criminal
complaint with the Police on September 1, 2005 in Hyderabad.
D1 Oils, whilst denying any allegation of forgery, inter alia
contended that if the Applicant truly believed that the Supply
Agreement had not been terminated (by the Deed of Termination),
it would not have entered into the R&D Agreement (which was
subsequent in time to the Deed of Termination) and under which,
the Applicant had received monies. D1 Oils contended that the
intention of entering into the R&D Agreement was to put an end
to the Supply Agreement.
Judgment:
The Court observed that the entire controversy revolved around
the purported Deed of Termination and that the claims of the
Applicant concerns willful breach of obligations by D1 Oils
under the Supply Agreement. The Court, exercising its judicial
power under Section 11 of the Act, as elucidated upon in
S.B.P. & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd., proceeding to
delve deeper into the matter and examine the fundamental
questions before it being whether there was, in fact (1) an
arbitration agreement and (2) a live dispute, between the
parties before it.
Relying upon its earlier decisions, the Court has held that:
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Where parties had agreed
that if disputes arose between them in respect of the
subject matter of the contract, then such disputes would be
referred to arbitrations – such an arrangement would spell
out an arbitration agreement;
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an arbitration clause was
not required to be stated in any particular form;
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it was immaterial whether
or not the expressions “arbitration”, “arbitrator” or
“arbitrators” had been used, where the intention of the
parties to refers disputes to arbitration could be
determined from the terms of the agreement;
Relying upon the intention of the parties recorded in the
Supply Agreement to refer disputes to institutional
arbitration and not through ad-hoc arbitration, the Court
held that there existed a valid arbitration agreement
between the parties.
Interestingly, whilst dealing
with the question of whether there was a live claim under the
arbitration agreement, the Court held that a number of issues
arose for determination such as whether the Deed of Termination
stood forged, whether it had been signed by two directors, who
were not authorized to sign it, effect of the (subsequent) R&D
Agreement on the Supply Agreement, whether the Joint Venture
Agreement replaced the Supply Agreement, whether the three
agreements should be read together or whether the Supply
Agreement was a stand-alone item, whether claims under the
Supply agreement stood extinguished or had ceased, in view of
the Deed of Termination.
Holding that if these issues
were to be looked into, there existed a ‘live claim’ between the
parties, the Court referred all disputes and differences between
the parties to the Singapore International Arbitration Centre,
which would nominate an Arbitrator from its panel to decide all
disputes and differences between the parties.
Analysis &
Implications:
This judgment reaffirms that
intention of the parties to arbitrate is pivotal in determining
whether there exists an arbitration agreement. Thus as held
earlier in Great Offshore Ltd. Versus Iranian Offshore
Engineering & Construction Company (see
our hotline dated September 09, 2008), where the Court has
held that technical issues such as stamping, seals, signatures
or production of original agreement are to be considered as mere
indicators of intent and should not be insisted upon if parties
are able to show intent (to arbitrate) in other ways. Further,
in M. Dayanand Reddy versus A.P. Industrial Corporation
Limited
2 the Court has held that the intention of the parties
to refer the dispute to arbitration can be ascertained from the
terms of the agreement and thus the use of expressions such as “arbitration”,
“arbitrator” or “arbitrators” is immaterial.
In light of this judgment,
even where there exists a specific arbitration agreement
whereunder parties have agreed to refer disputes to
institutional arbitration but have failed to name such
institution, the courts will interpret such clause as the intent
to refer disputes to institutional arbitration (instead of
ad-hoc arbitration) rather than as a vague and inoperative
clause.
This judgment has a
significant impact on the much debated issue raised by the
judgment in S.B.P. & Co. versus M/s Patel Engineering Ltd. &
Anr3,
on whether the act of appointment of arbitrators under Section
11 of the Act is an administrative or judicial power of the
courts. The debate revolves around the issue that whilst the Act
seeks to minimize the role of the courts in arbitration, if the
court treats its powers under Section 11 as a judicial power,
the courts would, effectively, have powers to delve deeper into
the issues in the dispute around the arbitration agreement and
would not merely have a limited role to play, as envisaged under
the Act. As of now though, the judgment in S.B.P. & Co.
versus M/s Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr is settled law on
this aspect and which judgment had, in the instant case, enabled
the Court to delve into the matter and let the intention of the
parties to arbitrate prevail.
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1. (2005)
8 SCC 618
2. (1993) 3 SCC 137
3. (2005) 8 SCC 618
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Litigation & Dispute
Resolution Team
You can direct your queries or comments to the authors
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